Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Economics Faculty Research and Publications

Economics, Department of

4-1-2019

The Great Recession and Public Education
William N. Evans
University of Notre Dame

Robert M. Schwab
University of Maryland at College Park

Kathryn L. Wagner
Marquette University, kathryn.l.wagner@marquette.edu

Accepted version. Education Finance and Policy, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Spring 2019): 298-326. DOI.© 2019
The MIT Press Technology Partner. Used with permission.
This article was previously published as a working paper and is available in ePublications@Marquette
here: https://epublications.marquette.edu/econ_workingpapers/58/

Education Finance and Policy Just Accepted MS.
doi:10.1162/EDFP_a_00245
 by Association for Education Finance and Policy

The Great Recession and Public Education

William N. Evans

Robert M. Schwab

Kathryn L. Wagner

Department of Economics

Department of

(Corresponding Author)

University of Notre Dame

Economics

Department of Economics

Notre Dame, IN 46530

University of Maryland

College of Business Admin.

wevans1@nd.edu

College Park, MD 20742

Marquette University

and NBER

schwab@econ.umd.edu

Milwaukee, WI 53201
kathryn.l.wagner@marquette.edu

Acknowledgements: We thank the Russell Sage Foundation for their generous support of this
research. We thank Frances Kelsey for excellent research assistance.

Education Finance and Policy Just Accepted MS.
doi:10.1162/EDFP_a_00245
 by Association for Education Finance and Policy

Abstract

We examine the impact of the Great Recession on public education finance and employment.
Five major themes emerge from our work. First, nearly 300,000 school employees lost their jobs.
Second, schools that were heavily dependent financially on state governments were particularly
vulnerable to the recession. Third, local revenues from the property tax actually increased during
the recession, primarily because millage rates rose in response to declining property values.
Fourth, inequality in school spending rose sharply during the Great Recession. We argue,
however, that we need to be very cautious about this result. School spending inequality has risen
steadily since 2000; the trend in inequality we see in the 2008-13 period is very similar to the
trend we see in the 2000-08 period. Fifth, the federal government’s efforts to shield education
from some of the worst effects of the recession achieved their major goal.

2

Education Finance and Policy Just Accepted MS.
doi:10.1162/EDFP_a_00245
 by Association for Education Finance and Policy

<A>I. Introduction
The recession that began in December 2007 was the most severe economic downturn in
the U.S. since the Great Depression. The unemployment rate reached 10 percent in October
2009.1 Over eight million private sector jobs were lost and private employment did not return to
pre-recession levels until spring 2014.2 As late as April of 2016, there were over two million
long-term unemployed people in the United States.3, Analysts often call this period the Great
Recession (GR), a term that is well-deserved.
In this paper we look at the impact of the recession on public schools. Our goal is to
describe what happened to K-12 public education during the recession and to learn what we can
about how to shield schools and their students from the worst effects of any future recessions.
Other papers have examined the impact of the GR on education. Several have focused on
New York and New Jersey schools. Bhalla, Chakrabarti, and Livingston (2017) show that New
York schools fared much better than New Jersey schools. New York received more than twice as
much federal aid per pupil than New Jersey and New Jersey state aid to schools fell much more
sharply. Chakrabarti, Livingston, and Setren (2015) found that, in New York, increases in federal
aid largely offset decreases in state aid, and consequently the recession had little impact on the
overall level of education spending in the state. They also showed that the recession hit wealthy
school districts the hardest. Chakrabarti and Sutherland (2013) argue that in New Jersey, noninstructional expenditures declined much more than instructional expenditures, non-tenured
teachers were more likely to be laid off, and expenditures in high poverty and urban school
districts fell significantly.

1

https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/UNRATE
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/PAYEMS
3
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t12.htm. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics classifies someone as longterm unemployed if they have been unemployed for at least 27 weeks.
2
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In this paper, rather than examining the experience of a few states, we take a somewhat
broader perspective. In Section II we present a brief overview of the structure of education
finance in the U.S. and then look at the aggregate effect of the recession on state and local
government revenue, employment in public schools, and school spending. We compare the
impact of the most recent recession to past recessions. In Section III we use a balanced panel of
district-level data to determine how the recession affected different types of schools. So, for
example, we ask if the structure of school finance was an important determinant of the impact of
the recession. In Section IV, we continue our work with the panel of districts and look at
inequality in school spending from 1972 through 2013. An important question here is whether
the recession had a particularly severe effect on schools that served children from low-income
families. In Section V we look at the efficacy of the federal government’s efforts to offset at least
part of the effect of the GR on public education. Section VI includes a brief summary and
conclusions.
Five major themes emerge from our work. First, the impact of the GR was
unprecedented. Nearly 300,000 school employees lost their jobs, wiping out the aggregate gains
made in reducing class size during the 13 years before the recession. It took five years for state
and local revenues to return to the pre-recession levels.
Second, schools in states where districts were heavily dependent on funds from state
governments were particularly vulnerable to the effects of the GR. There has been a marked shift
towards state-financed public schools over the past 40 years, in part as a result of litigation and
legislation to equalize school resources across districts. We show that revenues from the major
state taxes -- income and sales taxes -- fell sharply over the GR. Our results suggest that an

4
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unintended side effect of these efforts has been to make school spending more vulnerable to
recessions.
Third, despite the fact that the recession occurred at a time when property values were
plummeting, property tax revenue, the mainstay of local school finance, actually rose over the
course of the recession. Many school districts were able to offset the shrinking property tax base
by raising the property tax rate. Property tax rates decline relatively little when property values
increase and increase markedly when values decline, meaning the property tax is a stable source
of revenue.
Fourth, inequality in school spending rose dramatically during the GR. School spending
inequality had risen steadily since 2000 and the trend in inequality in the 2008 to 2013 period is
similar to the trend we see in the 2000 to 2008 period. Thus while the gap in spending between
wealthy and poor schools rose during the recession, the role of the recession is much less clear.
Fifth, we argue that the federal government’s efforts to shield education from some of the
worst effects of the GR achieved their major goal. The State Fiscal Stabilization Fund (SFSF),
created under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, provided $53.6 billion of
funding for public schools during the early parts of the recession. We find that as a result of
SFSF money, school spending was flat during the 2008/09 and 2009/10 school years.

<A>II.

The Effect of the Great Recession on Education at the National Level
In this section, we present estimates of education finance, spending, and employment at

the national level over the great recession. As we show later in this section, the impact of the
great recession was in part a function of the way education finance has evolved over time. To set
the stage for this discussion, we initially present some basic facts about K-12 education finance.
<B>A. Some Basics of K-12 Education Finance
5
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Annual real education spending per student nearly tripled between the 1970/71 and the
2012/13 school years.4 Education spending, however, is sensitive to the business cycle. In
Figure 1 we graph the de-trended residuals of real per student current expenditures versus the
national unemployment rate.5 The graph shows a strong negative relationship between these two
series except for the mid-1990s. 6,7 Given this pattern, it is not a surprise to find a large drop in
real current expenditures at the start of the Great Recession.
There have been some significant changes in the way schools are financed in the U.S.
over the last 40 years. In Figure 2 we summarize education revenues by source over time.8 State
governments now play a much larger role in education finance than they once did. In the early
part of the 20th century, nearly 80 percent of the revenues for public education came from local
governments. 9 In 1970 local governments provided 52.4 percent of K-12 revenues while the
state share was less than 40 percent. By 2008 the local share had fallen to 43.5 while the state
share had risen to 48.3 percent.
The growing role of the states in education is in part a response to a long series of court
cases that have challenged the constitutionality of an education finance system that has led to

4

Unless otherwise noted, years here are fiscal years. A fiscal year corresponds roughly to an academic year and so,
for example, fiscal 1969 is roughly the 1968 – 69 academic year. Current expenditures includes salaries, employee
benefits, purchased professional and technical services, purchased property and other services, and supplies. It also
includes gross school system expenditure for instruction, support services, and non-instructional functions. It
excludes expenditure for debt service, capital outlay, and reimbursement to other governments (including other
school systems).
5
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/UNRATE/.
6
We estimated the correlation between the data series to be -0.23. Though this is not incredibly large in magnitude it
does suggest a clear negative relationship between student spending and unemployment.
7
In the United States, the unofficial beginning and ending dates of national recessions have been defined by
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). The NBER defines a recession as “a significant decline in
economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real gross
domestic product (GDP), real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales.”
8
Data is taken from http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d12/tables/dt12_202.asp
and http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d13/tables/dt13_235.10.asp.
9
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs93/93442.pdf
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wide disparities in education spending across school districts.10 Serrano I in 1971 and
subsequent cases led to a requirement of equal spending per student in California. More recent
cases have been driven by concerns over the adequacy of funding for public education, in
particular the funding of education for students from disadvantaged backgrounds. At last count,
litigants had challenged the constitutionality of state school finance systems in 45 states
(Corcoran and Evans 2015). In most cases, a decision by a high court to overturn a state
education financing system has been accompanied by a direct order to make fundamental
changes to school funding formulas. State legislatures have also initiated their own far-reaching
reforms to school finance systems in the wake of unsuccessful litigation (e.g., Georgia and
Idaho), under the threat of litigation (e.g., Missouri and Oklahoma; see Minorini and Sugarman
1999), or in response to political pressure (e.g., Michigan).
Historically, the federal government has played a small role in K-12 education finance.
The average federal share over the 1970-2008 period was 7.8 percent. The federal government
did provide significant additional funding at the start of the GR in response to falling state and
local tax revenues. As a consequence, in 2010 the federal share of education spending reached 13
percent. In the last several years the federal role has moved back toward historical levels.
In Table 1 we report revenues to state and local governments from broad sources in
2012.11 In the first two columns we show the tax type and source. In the next two columns we
report total revenues by type and the fraction of these total state revenues from this tax. We then
present the same information for local governments, and then data for these two levels combined.
There is significant variation in state tax structures. Seven states have no income tax (and
10

This literature is captured in a number of papers including, Evans, Murray and Schwab (1997); Murray, Evans and
Schwab (1998); Hoxby (2001); Card and Payne (2002); Figlio, Husted and Kenny (2004); and more recently,
Jackson, Johnson and Persico (2016); LaFortune, Rothstein, and Schanzenbach (2016); and Candelaria and Shores
(forthcoming).
11
https://www.census.gov/govs/qtax/.
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two others tax only dividend and interest income); five states do not have a sales tax.12 Despite
this heterogeneity, the income and sales taxes are the key sources of revenue for the states.
Averaging across all states, 42 percent of state government revenues come from individual and
corporate income taxes and an additional 37 percent comes from various sales taxes. Less than
two percent of state revenues come from property taxes. We find a very different picture at the
local level. The property tax generates about 59 percent of local government tax revenue while
sales and income taxes produce about one fifth of total revenues. Given these facts, one might
then expect that the collapse of the housing markets at the start of the GR might have had a
particularly severe impact on schools. We consider this issue in the next section of the paper.

<B>B. The Impact of the Great Recession on the Financing of Public K-12 Education
This section of the paper focuses on the effects of the GR on the financing of public K-12
education.13 The impact of the GR on state and local tax revenues was dramatic. In Figure 3, we
present a four-quarter moving average index of real state and local tax revenue from the four
largest sources of revenues (property taxes, income taxes, sales taxes and corporate income
taxes).14 We present data for the GR (which began in the fourth quarter of 2007) and the two
previous recessions (which began in the third quarter of 1990 and the first quarter of 2001).15 We
set revenues equal to 100 at the start of a particular recession. The horizontal axis shows the
number of quarters after the start of the recession.
Figure 3 shows that the effect of the GR on state and local tax revenue was
unprecedented. State and local revenues were constant for about a year after the start of the
12

Information about state tax policies can be found at http://taxfoundation.org.
See Gordon (2012) for a further analysis of the impact of the Great Recession on state and local government
finance.
14
http://www.census.gov/govs/qtax/ The four-quarter moving average is constructed by averaging the real value of
the current quarter with the three quarters prior to it.
15
We use the GDP implicit price deflator to generate real values and a four-quarter moving average because of very
large within fiscal year variation in quarterly revenues.
13
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recession but then quickly fell by about five percent. Revenues remained flat for five quarters
and then rose very slowly. It was not until 18 quarters after the start of the recession that state
and local tax revenues returned to pre-recession levels. But of course the demand for state and
local government services was far from flat during this period. For example, Medicaid rolls grew
by 11.8 million people – an increase of 28 percent – between 2007 and 2012.16
We see a very different story when we look at previous recessions. Revenues never fell
during the 1990 recession. Real revenues were eight percent higher 11 quarters after the start of
the recession and then remained flat for the next four quarters. In the 2001 recession revenues
fell for nine quarters then increased dramatically. As we will say many times in this paper, the
impact of the GR was very different from previous recessions.
Figure 4 looks at the time path of an index of a four-quarter moving average of major
sources of real state and local tax revenues following the start of the GR. All of the indexes are
set to 100 at the start of the recession. Revenues from state and local income taxes, sales taxes,
and corporate income taxes all fell very sharply at the start of the recession. Individual income
tax collections were down 16 percent eight quarters into the recession and remained 10 percent
below pre-recession levels for 13 quarters. Income tax revenues were still two percent below its
2007 levels 20 quarter later. Sales tax revenues declined more slowly than income tax revenues
but these revenues were eight percent below the 2007 level 15 months later. Revenues from
corporate income taxes reached a nadir 11 quarters after the start the GR and were down 28
percent. Corporate income and sales taxes were still lower by 22 and four percent, respectively,
five years after the start of the GR.
Property taxes followed a very different pattern. As Figure 4 shows, revenues from
property taxes actually grew steadily during the first three years of the recession. They then fell
16

http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/monthly-medicaid-enrollment-in-thousands-june/
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slightly but remained 10 percent above pre-recession levels 15 quarters. This is in some ways a
surprising result. The housing market collapse was a key element of the GR. The Case-Shiller
Home Price Index, a leading measure of housing prices, suggests that the housing bubble began
to deflate at least two years before the recession.17 By the fourth quarter of 2007 the average
price of a home was 20 percent below its 2005 peak. Prices continued to fall during the first year
of the recession and by December 2008 the real price of a home was roughly one-third below its
peak. New home starts fell from a seasonally adjusted rate of nearly 2.3 million in early 2006 to
a low of less than 500,000 units in December 2007. Housing starts remained below one million
homes per year even five years after the start of the recession. 18 There is some debate as to what
extent the housing market collapse was a cause of the recession and to what extent it was a result
of the recession, but what is clear is that the magnitude of the collapse was unmatched.
The property tax is assessed on the value of residential real property (i.e. personal real
estate), commercial, business and farm real property, and in some states personal property (e.g.,
automobiles). Residential real property accounts for approximately 60 percent of taxable
assessments and is the largest component of the tax base by a significant margin; commercial,
industrial and farm property account for around 30 percent, and personal property accounts for
less than 10 percent.19 It is difficult to square two seemingly inconsistent results: the property
tax fared much better than other state and local taxes during the GR even though the property tax
base collapsed.
Several papers have noted that local jurisdictions seem to have the ability to raise
property tax rates to offset property value declines. Lutz, Molloy, and Shan (2011) find that
assessed values lag market values in many states, which help to support property tax revenues
17

http://us.spindices.com/indices/real-estate/sp-case-shiller-us-national-home-price-index
https://www.census.gov/construction/nrc/historical_data/
19
Statistics are from Lutz, Molloy, and Shan (2011).
18
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when house prices fall. They do find that, in aggregate, property tax millage rates rise when
property values decline. These results are born out in analyses of specific states including
Georgia (Alm, Buschman, and Sjoquist 2011), New York (Chakrabarti, Livingston, and Roy
2014), and Florida (Ihlanfeldt 2011).
We have looked at the hypothesis that there is an asymmetric response in tax rates to
changing assessed values. The argument here is that when property values are increasing the tax
rate falls but not so much that revenues decline. In contrast, when property values are falling,
millage rates can be increased to more than offset the decline in values. To test this hypothesis,
we have collected data on assessed valuations and property tax rates for several years for all
school districts in five states: Illinois (2008-11), Washington (2009-12), Virginia (2006-11),
Texas (2009-13), and Washington (2008-12).20 In all cases, we took the data from peak to
trough in per student assessed property values. Note that the peak varies across states, a
reflection of how frequently properties are assessed. In all cases we have real assessed values per
student and property tax millage rates at the school district level. We use these data to estimate
the econometric model
%ΔMRi = α0 + α1Di + α2%ΔPVPCi · Di + α3%ΔPVPCi · (1 – Di) + εi

(1)

where the dependent variable %ΔMRi is the percentage change from peak to trough in district i's
property tax millage rate. We define %ΔPVPCi as the percentage change from peak to trough in

20

Data on local tax rates for Virginia can be found at http://www.tax.virginia.gov/site.cfm?alias=LocalTaxRates,
whereas tax collections are found at http://www.tax.virginia.gov/site.cfm?alias=SalesRatioStudies. Financial data
for Washington is provided on an annual basis and the data for 2012-13 school year is found at
http://www.k12.wa.us/safs/PUB/FIN/1213/fs.asp. Data for Texas is available at
http://www.tea.state.tx.us/index2.aspx?id=2147504614&menu_id=645&menu_id2=789. Illinois data is available at
http://webprod1.isbe.net/ilearn/ASP/index.asp. The data for Ohio for tax year 2012 is available at
http://www.tax.ohio.gov/tax_analysis/tax_data_series/school_district_data/publications_tds_school/SD1CY12.aspx.
We should note these states were selected because we could easily retrieve the data.
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property values per capita in a school district and we define Di as a dummy variable that has a
value of 1 if %ΔPVPCi is positive (i.e., D is 1 in those districts where the per student property
values rose). Because all the variables of interest are in percent changes, the coefficients on α2
and α3 are elasticities. The elasticity of the tax rate with respect to tax base changes is then α2 in
districts where the tax base is rising and α3 in districts where the tax base is falling. We are
interested in three hypotheses. First, is α2 equal to α3? If so, then local government response to
changing property base is symmetric. Second, is α2 or α3 equal to 0? If so, then the millage rate is
unaffected by changes in the tax base. In this case property tax collections would fall at the same
rate as the tax base; government would offset none of the change in the property tax base by
changing the millage rate. Third, is α2 or α3 equal to -1? If so, then changes in the millage rate
completely offset changes in the tax base. In this case property tax collections would remain
constant when the base changes.
Table 2 presents our OLS estimates of (1) for five states. In the final column, we report
estimates from a model that pools these five states and adds a state dummy to the model. We can
reject the hypothesis that government response is symmetric in all models at the five percent
level. In all six models, we cannot reject the null that α2 = 0 suggesting that tax rates do not
adjust down when property values increase. In contrast, school districts are much more likely to
raise the tax rate when the tax base falls than they are to lower the tax rate when property values
rise. We can reject the null that α3=0 in all cases. We cannot reject the hypothesis that changes in
the property tax rate fully offset changes in the tax base for Illinois, Virginia, Ohio, and the
pooled sample. For Washington (Texas), our estimate of α3 is statistically smaller (larger)
than -1.

12
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In all, our results strongly suggest that school districts were able to offset a declining tax
base during the recession by raising the tax rate. This result has important policy implications.
All taxes are unpopular, but the property tax is often seen as one of the most unpopular of all.21 It
is highly visible because taxpayers typically pay it directly. The tax is particularly unpopular
among the elderly who often face significant tax bills but have relatively modest incomes. The
tax base is typically distributed across local governments in very uneven ways, which contributes
to extreme fiscal disparities across jurisdictions. But one advantage of the property tax is that it
has proven to be a stable source of revenue. Property tax revenues in the past have been
relatively insensitive to the business cycles. But until the GR, virtually all of the evidence on the
stability of the property tax came from episodes when the real estate market was fairly stable
despite ups and downs of the economy as a whole. The experience during the GR tells us that the
stability of the property tax is a more general result than we might have imagined. Property tax
revenues continued to rise even during one of the greatest upheavals in the real estate market.
As we noted above, states have assumed a larger role in education finance over the last
40 years and rely on more volatile forms or funding. This shift toward state funding may have an
unintended side effect. It could have made public education funding much more sensitive to the
effects of the GR. We will present some further evidence on this point in section III of the paper.

<B>C. Employment in Public K-12 Education
We now turn to the effect of the GR on employment in K-12 education. Our primary data
source here is the monthly U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Current Employment Statistics,
a monthly survey of roughly 550,000 worksites that is available back to 1939. Those data allow
us to track all public sector school personnel but do not allow us to consider the impact of the

21

See, for example, James Alm (2013) and Cabral and Hoxby (2012).

13

Education Finance and Policy Just Accepted MS.
doi:10.1162/EDFP_a_00245
 by Association for Education Finance and Policy

recession on jobs for teachers separately from other educational employment that may not be as
actively involved in the classroom environment such as administrators, guidance counselors, and
librarians.
Figure 5 presents an index of full-time-equivalent employment in public K-12 education,
the private sector, state government, and local government outside of K-12 education for the 36
months before and 60 months after the start of the GR. Each series is scaled so that it equals 100
at the start of the recession. Two points are of particular interest in the figure. First, Figure 5
shows that employment in education followed a very different time path than employment in the
private sector. Private sector employment fell sharply at the start of the recession; two years after
the start of the recession private employment was seven percent lower than at the start. In data
not shown in this graph, private employment returned to its pre-recession level by March of
2014. Second, the recession took a substantial toll on public education. Jobs for school
employees increased slightly or were flat during the first two years of the recession but then fell
dramatically. Employment in public schools had not returned to pre-recession level more than
five years after the start of the GR. In total, employment in public schools fell by 294,700 from
the start of the recession until January 2013. This represents a 3.7 percent decrease in
employment. Employment in K-12 schools increased slightly in calendar year 2013, adding back
only 10,000 jobs. From fall 2007 through fall 2013, public school enrollment rose by 1.6
percent,22 and so the drop in public school employment meant that the ratio of employees
(largely teachers) to students fell by 5.1 percent over this period. Pupil/teacher ratios fell from
17.4 to 16.3 between the 1989/90 and 2003/04 school year, which was a 4.5 percent decline. The
GR thus wiped out 13 years of decline in the pupil/teacher ratio in just three years.23

22
23

http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_203.20.asp
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d13/tables/dt13_208.10.asp
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A second data source allows us to take an initial look at the distribution of lost jobs
within public schools. Our analysis draws on data from the Common Core of Data, which is an
annual census of public schools and school districts. Data on employment in broad job categories
for all public schools is available in the Department of Education’s Digest of Education
Statistics.24
In Figure 6 we present an index of fall employment from 1997/98 through 2013/14
school years for four broad groups of employees in public schools: teachers, teacher aids, support
staff and other employees which includes district administrators, principals, librarians and
guidance counselors. We set each index equal to 100 in the 2007-08 school year. As Figure 6
shows, the number of teachers rose at the slowest rate among the four groups in the education
sector between 1997/98 and 2008/08: teachers and support staff increased 14 percent, other
employees 21 percent, and aids 22 percent over that year period. Employment peaked in 2008/09
and over the next three school years, the number of teachers fell 3.7 percent compared to a
decrease of just 1.4 percent for support staff. Teachers represented 51 percent of employment in
2008 but were responsible for 63 percent of job loss over the first three years of the GR
Figure 7 compares the effects of the most recent recession on public school employment
to the effects of three previous recessions. In this figure, we present an index of K-12
employment for the four recessions and scale each time series so that employment equals 100 at
the start of each recession. The horizontal axis measures months since the start of each recession.
Figure 7 shows that the impact of the GR on teachers and other personnel was unparalleled. In
the 1990 and 2001 recessions, public school employment continued to rise steadily despite the
economic downturn. In the 1981 recession, which was much more severe than the 1990 and 2001
recessions, public school employment fell for two years but then recovered fairly quickly. Five
24

http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d13/tables/dt13_213.10.asp

15

Education Finance and Policy Just Accepted MS.
doi:10.1162/EDFP_a_00245
 by Association for Education Finance and Policy

years after the 1981 recession began, public education employment was about three percent
higher than at the start of the recession. But as we showed above, employment in K-12 education
remained five percent below the December 2007 level 60 months after the start of the recession.

<A>III. Which Schools Were Impacted the Most by the Great Recession?
We now shift gears and look at the effect of the GR on district spending for K-12
education. In this section, we examine how the structure of school finance in a state or school
district affect the impact of the recession on schools.
To address this question, we have developed a balanced panel school district data. We
describe the construction of our data set in the online appendix to this paper. Specifically, we
match data from the Common Core to the financial data contained in the F-33 files. Our sample
consists of annual observations for 9,692 regular school districts for the 1994-95 school year
through the 2013-14 school year.25 Because of missing data, the final data set excludes many
districts, mostly ones with smaller enrollments.26 As a consequence, while the data set contains
only 71 percent of all regular districts, those districts account for 88 percent of all public school
students.
We initially focus on one question: which schools were affected most severely by the
GR? The results from the last section suggest that, everything else equal, school districts that
relied heavily on state funding were more vulnerable than districts that relied on support from
local taxes. As we showed, states generate most of their revenues from income and sales taxes,
and both of these taxes fell sharply during the recession. In contrast, local governments rely

25

According to the NCES, regular districts include local education agencies that operate primary and secondary
schools but excludes such districts as regional education service agencies, supervisory union administrative centers,
state or federally operated agencies, and independent charter schools.
26
Average enrollment in dropped districts was 3,277 students versus 4,232 students in sample districts
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primarily on property taxes, and property tax revenues were fairly stable during the GR.
We use our balanced panel of school districts described above to shed light on this issue.
The dependent variable in this econometric work is the percent change in per student spending
for the 2006-07 and 2010-11 school years. We would like to use data on income in this analysis,
but income data are not available at the school district level. We therefore use the percentage
change in county-level per capita income from 2007 to 2011 constructed from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis’s Local Area and Personal Income and Employment Regional Data.27 We
also merge this with the change in the county unemployment rate over the 2007-11 period taken
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Local Area Unemployment Statistics.28 In column 1 of
Table 3 we regress the outcome of interest on these two variables plus the fraction of district
revenues that came from state sources. In this column, we report OLS standard errors in square
brackets and standard errors that allow for within-state correlation in the residuals in parentheses.
Looking at the parameter estimates and the OLS standard errors, we find what we think
most people would predict: expenditures/pupil fell sharply in school districts where the
unemployment rate rose or per capita income fell. The results also suggest that districts with
greater support from the state in 2006/07 experienced significantly lower growth over the next
five years.29 It is not clear, however, if the estimates in the first column of Table 3 capture
district-level characteristics or state-level characteristics. One piece of evidence on this question
is that when we allow an arbitrary correlation in errors within a state, the standard errors increase
by a factor of five, suggesting that there is some shock that is common to districts within states.
27

Per capita income information can be downloaded from the Bureau of Economic Analysis at
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=70&step=1&isuri=1&acrdn=5#reqid=70&step=25&isuri=1&7022=49
&7023=7&7024=non-industry&7001=749&7029=49&7090=70.
28
State unemployment rates are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Local Area Unemployment Statistics and were
downloaded from the Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service at http://www.ers.usda.gov/dataproducts/county-level-data-sets/download-data.aspx#.U8_727FvLkg
29
In our sample, 45.8 percent of the variation in the share of education revenue from the state in 2007 is within state
and across districts; the remaining 54.2 percent of the variation is across states.
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In the second column, we add state effects to the model and cluster the standard errors at the
state level. Note that the coefficients on change in income and state share are now no longer
statistically significant and the coefficient on the unemployment rate is actually the wrong sign.
This suggests that the results in column 1 capture events at the state level rather than what is
happening at the district level. In the third column we get some sense of the variables that are
driving this result. We drop the state effects and add in four variables measured at the state level:
the percentage change in real per capita income from 2007-11,30 the change in the state
unemployment rate,31 the share of K-12 revenues provided by the state, and the change in house
prices from June of 2007 to June of 2011 as measured by the state housing price index from
Freddie Mac.32 In this model, the only two variables that are statistically significant are the
change in the state unemployment rate and the state share of education revenues for all districts
in the state. Nationwide, the unemployment rate rose from 4.6 in June of 2007 to 9.1 percent in
June of 2011. From the results in column 3, a change this large at the state level is estimated to
reduce spending/student by (0.045)(-2.64)= -0.119 or almost 12 percent. It is not uncommon to
see a 20 percentage point difference in the state share in K-12 revenues across states, and a
change this big is estimated to reduce spending during the recession by four percent.
The results in the first three columns of Table 3 can be criticized because we do not
include a measure of changes in property value at the local level. Data to construct such a
measure are not available for all districts. However, the Freddie Mac housing price index is

30

Per capita income information at the state level can be downloaded from the Bureau of Economic Analysis at
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=70&step=1&isuri=1&acrdn=5#reqid=70&step=25&isuri=1&7022=49
&7023=7&7024=non-industry&7001=749&7029=49&7090=70.
31
State unemployment rates are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Local Area Unemployment Statistics and were
downloaded from the Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service at http://www.ers.usda.gov/dataproducts/county-level-data-sets/download-data.aspx#.U8_727FvLkg.
32
This data is available for download at http://www.freddiemac.com/finance/fmhpi/.
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calculated at the level of the Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA).33 In the final three columns of
Table 3 we reduced the sample to the 3,692 districts that are located in CBSAs, and so we can
add a local housing price index as a covariate when we use this restricted sample. The basic
results in this case are qualitatively the same as the full sample. We find in column (4) that there
are large effects of local economic conditions on spending that seem to be proxying for statelevel variables, such as state effects (column 5) or state-level economic variables (column 6).
Table 4 summarizes our econometric estimates of some of the determinants of the impact
of the recession on the district-level pupil/teacher ratio. The dependent variable in those three
models is the percent change in the district pupil/teacher ratio between 2007 and 2011. The
models in columns (1) – (3) mirror the structure of the estimates in Table 3 where numbers in
brackets represent regular OLS standard errors and the numbers in parentheses represent the
standard errors clustered at the state level. Since we do not have school district level measures of
unemployment and income, we use county-level aggregates for these variables.
In column (1) where we add in covariates at the county level, we see that rising income
and falling unemployment rates reduce the pupil/teacher ratio. These estimates are statistically
significant at conventional levels when regular OLS standard errors are used but the standard
errors increase appreciably when we cluster at the state level. With either standard error, the
fraction of revenues from the state is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that districts
that are heavily dependent on the state saw an increase in the pupil/teacher level. In column (2),
none of these results remain statistically significant when we add state fixed effects. When we
take out the state effects and add in state variables in column (3), the only statistically significant
variable is the fraction of K-12 revenues from the state across all districts. The results are

33

A CBSA includes an urban center and its suburbs. CBSAs are defined by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) and replaced the old OMB concept of a metropolitan area.
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essentially unchanged when we reduce the sample to districts in metro areas. However, the
percentage change in the state-level housing price index is positive and statistically significant.

<A>IV.

The Impact of the Recession on School Spending Inequality

In the previous sections we focused largely on how the GR altered average spending
outcomes. Here we turn to the impact of the recession on inequality in education spending.
Inequality in income and wealth rose throughout much of the last half-century. Inequality in
education spending, however, fell during much of that period (Corcoran and Evans 2015;
Murray, Evans, and Schwab 1998). Here we ask if this trend continued during the GR.
We consider inequality in current expenditures per pupil from unified districts over a
long period. For data prior to 1993, we use measures of inequality reported by Evans and
Schwab and their various coauthors, while for 1993 and on, we rely on the panel data from the
previous section. In all, we have data for ten-year intervals from 1972 until 1992, 1990, and
annual data from 1993.
We look at four measures of inequality.34 The Gini coefficient ranges from 0 (perfect
equality) to 1 (perfect inequality) and is based on the Lorenz curve. The 95/5 ratio is the ratio of
spending for the student at the 95th percentile in district spending divided by the student at the 5th
percentile in spending. The coefficient of variation equals the ratio of the standard deviation to
the mean of school spending. The final measure is the Theil index, which has the convenient
property that it can be decomposed into between and within state measures of inequality.
The time series for the four national estimates of between-district inequality are presented
in Table 5. In the first row, we report the baseline levels of the inequality measures. After that,

34

See Berne and Stiefel (1984) for a thorough discussion of the properties of measures of equity in public school
funding.
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for ease of exposition, we report indexes of the measures with the baseline year (1972) equal to
1.00. Looking at the entire 42-year period between 1972 and 2013, we see very little change
overall in the inequality of school spending. This is true regardless of which measure of
inequality we rely on. This overall trend, however, masks enormous differences within this time
period. There are two distinct sub-periods. From 1972 to 2000 inequality fell sharply. Depending
on which measure we use, inequality in school spending fell between 21 and 39 percent during
that period. The U.S. did make significant progress in an effort to reduce the disparities between
rich and poor school districts.
But the trend changed dramatically in 2000. All four of our measures reversed course and
rose steadily from 2000 to 2013. The increase in inequality during this 14-year period undid
virtually all of the progress that was made during the preceding 29 years. By 2013, the
coefficient of variation and the Thiel index were essentially at their 1972 values. Although
finance reform was able to reduce inequality, the success was fleeting.
The last four columns of Table 5 exploit the unique properties of the Theil index of
inequality and look at the national, between-state and within-state measures of current
expenditures per pupil. For the within- and between-state measures, we divide by the total Theil
index in 1972 so these two measures sum to the indexed value. Both measures fell sharply from
1972 to 2000. Within-state inequality fell by 41 percent and between-state inequality fell by 38
percent in this period. There is a fair amount of evidence that the decline in inequality in school
spending was at least in part the result of successful court-ordered state efforts to reduce
inequality. Murray, Evans, and Schwab (1998), for example, found that court-ordered education
finance reform did significantly decrease within-state inequality in spending.
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Although rising between- and within-state inequality both contributed to the overall
increase in inequality in education spending starting in 2000, the main factor here is growing
differences between the states in school spending. Between-state inequality rose by 86 percent
between 2000 and 2013; within-state inequality in spending rose by just 21 percent during the
period.
It is not clear that the GR played a major role in the increase in inequality in school
spending. All of our inequality measures rose at nearly the same rate between 2000 and 2008 and
between 2008 and 2013. The data suggest that a combination of factors other than the effect of
the GR led to a continual rise in inequality in education expenditures over the 14 year period.
Almost certainly the increase in income and wealth inequality in the U.S. played a key role.
The results from Table 2 suggest an additional answer. When housing prices are
increasing, the elasticity of response on the millage rate is negative but much less than 1 in
absolute value. This suggests that as property values increase, tax revenues increase as well.
Hence, in an era of rising property values, we would expect faster growth in per student spending
in areas with faster growth in per student assessments. If the high spending states in the early
2000s were also those states with the fastest growth in property value, then this would help
explain why spending in these states grew so much. We do not have per student assessments for
all states over the past 14 years but we have a reasonable proxy, the change in housing prices
over that period. In Figure 8, we graph the percentage change in the Freddie Mac state-level
house price index between 2000 and 2011 versus the real state-level per pupil current
expenditures in 2000. Note that this graph has a steep positive slope, implying that high spending
states in 2000 had the greatest increase in house prices over the next 11 years. If the elasticity of
tax rates with respect to assessed valuations is less than 1 in absolute value when property values
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are increasing -- a result we found for five states in Table 2 -- this would help to explain the
growth in the between-state inequality in expenditures.

<A>V.

The Federal Government’s Response to the Great Recession

<B>A. The Stimulus Bill and Education Finance
President Obama signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA)
into law on February 17, 2009.35 ARRA was a key element of the government’s effort to fight
the recession that began in December 2007 and accelerated with the Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy in September 2008. The estimated cost of the bill when it was passed was $787
billion.36 ARRA included $237 billion in tax relief for individuals and $51 billion of tax cuts for
business. The bill provided $155.1 billion for health care (largely additional spending on
Medicaid, Medicare, and subsides for private insurance for people who were laid off from their
jobs), $105.3 billion for infrastructure investment, and $82.2 billion for extended unemployment
benefits and other aid to low income workers, the unemployed, and the elderly.
ARRA provided nearly $100 billion for education. The single largest component of the
aid to education was the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund (SFSF), a new, one-time appropriation of
$53.6 billion. Of this amount, the U.S. Department of Education (DOE) awarded governors
approximately $48.6 billion by formula in exchange for a commitment to advance essential
education reforms to benefit students from early learning through post-secondary education.37
The purpose of these funds was to help stabilize state and local government budgets in order to
35

Pl 111-5. https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ5/pdf/PLAW-111publ5.pdf
This section draws heavily on http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/leg/recovery/factsheet/stabilization-fund.html
37
The Department of Education was to use $5 billion of funding to make competitive grants under the “Race to the
Top” fund. These grants were designed to help states make significant improvement in student achievement. The
Department of Education was also authorized to spend up to $650 million to make competitive awards under the
“Invest in What Works and Innovation” fund. These awards were to serve as rewards to districts and nonprofit
organizations that had made significant gains in closing achievement gaps to serve as models for best practices.
36
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minimize and avoid reductions in education and other essential public services. Program funds
could also be used to help support the modernization and renovation of school facilities.
The ARRA specified that sixty-one percent of a state’s allocations were based on a state’s
relative population of individuals aged 5 to 24, and 39 percent were based on its relative share of
total population. States were required to use 81.8 percent of SFSF funds for the support of public
elementary, secondary, higher education, and (as applicable) early childhood education programs
and services. The states had to use their allocations to help restore FY 2009, 2010, and 2011
support for public elementary, secondary, and postsecondary education to the greater of the FY
2008 or FY 2009 level. The funds needed to restore support for elementary and secondary
education had to be run through the state's education funding formulae. If any SFSF funds
remained after the state had restored state support for elementary and secondary education and
higher education, the state was required to award the funds to school districts on the basis of the
relative Title I shares (but not subject to Title I program requirements). States were to use the
remaining 18.2 percent of their SFSF funds for education, public safety, and other government
services. This could include assistance for early learning, K-12 education, and support of public
colleges and universities. In addition, states could use these funds for modernization, renovation,
or repair of public school and public or private college facilities.
The Education Job Funds program, signed into law on August 10, 2010, was the second
major federal effort to offset some of the effects of the GR on public education.38 It provided
$10 billion in assistance to save or create education jobs for the 2010-2011 school year. The
DOE determined the allocation for each state39 by formula on the basis of (1) its relative

This section draws heavily on “Initial Guidance for the States on the Education Jobs Fund Program,” U.S.
Department of Education, April 15, 2011. (United States Department of Education, 2011).
39
The amount of funding available to each State under the program is provided on the program website at
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/educationjobsfund/index.html.
38
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population of individuals who are aged 5 to 24, and (2) its relative total population.40 States
were required to distribute these funds to school districts either through the State’s primary
elementary and secondary education funding formula(e) or on the basis of the districts’ relative
shares of funds under Part A of Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
(ESEA) for the most recent fiscal year for which data were available.
There have been several efforts to evaluate the impact of SFSF and the Education Job
Funds. In their studies of the New Jersey and New York experiences, Chakrabarti and Livingston
(2013a, 2013b) found that stimulus funds were an effective stopgap when state funding fell
sharply at the start of the recession. They also found that when the stimulus funding ended in
2011, education spending in both states fell since state and local funding sources had not fully
recovered. A 2009 analysis by the Obama administration looked at state funding for K-12 and
higher education for the two previous and current school years.41 It concluded that SFSF funds
restored nearly 100 percent of the 2008-09 budget gaps and a significant portion of the 2009-10
shortfalls. Based on an analysis of states’ initial and preliminary submissions of the first ARRA
quarterly reports, the study argued that over 250,000 education jobs have been retained or
created through ARRA.42

<B>B. The Distribution of Stimulus Funds
To begin an analysis of how the stimulus impacted schools, we first merged data on
stimulus payments to schools from the recovery.gov database to data from the Common Core
and F33 outlined above. This was a difficult exercise because the primary identification used in
the recovery.gov data set was the Duns number, which is not reported in NCES data sets. To
40

For purposes of this program, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico are defined as States.
See http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/DPC_Education_Report.pdf
42
Rentner and Ushe (2012) tracked the use of ARRA and Education Jobs funds and the implementation of ARRArelated reforms. These six reports were based on survey responses of state and local officials charged with
implementing these programs.
41
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match the data, we first selected grants for K-12 education based on the Catalog of Federal
Domestic Assistance (CDFA) number, then matched specific grants to recipients based on the
zip code of the recipient, and then visually identified whether the name of the recipient matched
the name of the district (in many districts by hand). We matched grants to the SY 2008-2009 F33
data.
A similar exercise was conducted by the Institute of Education Sciences (IES) of the
DOE (Garrison-Mogren, Gutmann, and Bachman 2012). In general, our estimates of dollar
amounts are slightly higher than the values in the IES report, mainly because we used a more
recent version of the recovery.gov data. In aggregate, our numbers for the SFSF grants differ by
less than 1 percent from the IES report and across all grants by only 2.7 percent. We do however
have a smaller number of districts because we match our data to the F33 instead of the Common
Core. Our numbers for funds differ most for pre-school grants where we find fewer districts but
record more grant dollars.

<B>C. SFSF Funds and School Finance: Some Econometric Evidence
In this section, we examine the impact of SFSF funding on state funding for education.
Consider a panel data set where we have state revenues per pupil over time for a sample of
districts. Let Sijt / Pupilijt be the state funding per pupil in district i, in state j in year t and let

SFSFijt / Pupilijt be the corresponding values distributed through the SFSF program. We would
like to estimate a simple regression of state spending per student on SFSF funding per student of
the form
𝑡
𝑡
𝑡
𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 ⁄𝑃𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑗
= 𝛽0 + 𝑆𝐹𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡 ⁄𝑃𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑗
𝛽1 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗 + 𝜈𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗

(2)
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t
t
where uij is a district fixed effect, v j is a state-specific year effect and  ij is a random error. If the

SFSF program is working as intended, then the coefficient 1 should be -1; that is, an additional
dollar from the federal government through this program allowed states to reduce spending by
exactly a dollar. In contrast, if 1 equals 0, then SFSF had no impact on state spending.43
We face two problems in estimating (2). First, the recovery.gov website records when
grants were first awarded but it does not indicate when they were spent. In the case of SFSF,
there is tremendous variation across states in when these funds were distributed to districts.
Some states such as California and Illinois spent the vast majority of funds in FY08 while other
states such as Virginia reserved a significant portion of funds for distribution in FY09 and FY10.
Unfortunately, we do not have a comprehensive source of data that indicates when states
distributed funds to the districts. Starting in FY09, districts reported three variables in the F-33
associated with ARRA funding. One measured new Title 1 funds, the second measured capital
outlays, and the third measured all funds that went to current expenditures. This third variable
would include SFSF funds, but it would also include other funds such as support for special
education. We use this third measure as a proxy for SFSF funds, but since this category
represented 81 percent of non-capital, non-Title 1 funds, it is a quite sensible proxy.
Second, there is potential endogeneity problem in the econometric estimation. If states
distributed more funds to districts with lower local revenues, then the size of SFSF awards may
signal something about the underlying financial health of the local area. We believe that the way
in which SFSF funds were distributed at the state and local level means that this endogeneity
issue can be addressed in a straightforward two-stage least-square (2SLS) procedure.

Thus β1 equal to -1 is evidence of a complete flypaper effect and β1 equal to 0 is evidence of the absence of a
flypaper effect.
43
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As we noted above, the allocation of SFSF funds had two distinct steps. First, states
received funds from the federal government. State allocations were determined by formula and
states received a specific amount based on the size of the student population and the size of the
state. Second, districts had to apply for SFSF funds. Because receipt of funds required districts to
agree to some specific reforms and enhanced reporting, some districts chose not to participate in
the SFSF program. Our data indicates that two percent of all school districts did not receive
SFSF funds. Non-participating districts tended to be smaller than average (the average size of
districts not receiving funds was 2,106 students while the corresponding number for participating
districts is 4,245), have fewer poor students (78 versus 86 percent receiving Title 1), and were in
rural areas (58 versus 55 percent).44 Overall, districts NOT receiving SFSF funds represent only
1.1 percent of all students and 2.1 percent of all districts in our sample.
In general, states distributed SFSF money in a way similar to the way they distributed
other state funds. In a regression of the SFSF share from the state on the state share of total
revenues in FY08, the coefficient (standard error) on this variable is 1.007 (0.013) and we cannot
reject the null that this coefficient equals 1. This is not surprising given the structure of SFSF as
described earlier in this section of the paper. The fact that states distributed SFSF funds in a
similar way to other state revenues will be exploited in a 2SLS procedure below. In particular,
once the total size of the state’s SFSF grant was announced, districts had a good sense of how
much they would receive from the state. Let SFSFjt be the total SFSF funds distributed by state j
in year t, let ij08 be the share of state j’s funds distributed to district i in FY08, and Pupilsijt be
the number of students from district i in year t. Our instrument for SFSFijt / Pupilijt is then

44

These numbers are based on data from the FY08 F-33 data.
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𝑡
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 ⁄𝑃𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑗

=

𝜃𝑖𝑗08 𝑆𝐹𝑆𝐹𝑗𝑡
𝑡
𝑃𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗

(3)

In year t, district i could expect to receive ij08 *100 percent of total SFSFjt funds distributed
under this program in year t; dividing this by district size turns it into a per pupil amount. In this
case we will use data from FY06 through FY11 which gives us three years before SFSF and
three years when all SFSF funds were supposed to be distributed. In years prior to the ARRA,

SFSFjt  0, so INSTijt / Pupilijt  0 . Because the instrument only makes sense for districts that
received SFSF funds, we delete districts that did not participate in that program. In all, our data
set has information for 9,450 districts over six years. In our 2SLS models we weight the
regressions by number of pupils and we cluster standard errors at the state level.
In the first column of Panel A in Table 6, we report the first-stage estimate where we
regress SFSFijt / Pupilijt on INSTijt / Pupilijt plus district effects and state-specific year effects. The
coefficient on the instrument is 0.83 and we can easily reject the null that the parameter equals 0.
The first-stage F-test is 66.8 so there are no concerns of finite sample bias in this case.We report
the 2SLS estimate of equation (4) in the second column of Panel A Table 6. The estimated
coefficient on SFSFijt / Pupilijt is -0.94 with a standard error of 0.256. We therefore can easily
reject the null that the coefficient is zero. We cannot, however, reject the hypothesis that federal
SFSF money fully offset the decrease in state funds for education, i.e., that the coefficient of
interest is equal to -1; the p-value on this second null hypothesis is -1 is 0.80. The results in
Panel A Table 6 therefore suggest that the SFSF program worked as intended; for every dollar
distributed to the districts through this program, the states reduced spending by a dollar and there
was no tax relief offered to local taxpayers from these grants.
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We examine the impact of SFSF spending on several key variables in the final three
columns of Panel A Table 6. Here we replace state funding per pupil as the outcome with local
revenues per student (column 3), total revenues per student (column 4) or education employment
per student (column 5). In 2SLS models, we find that SFSF funds are uncorrelated with these
three variables. Total spending would include SFSF spending and so this result implies that
federal funds were able to fully offset decreases in state and local funding.
We present estimates of a falsification analysis of our model in Panel B of Table 6. In this
analysis we consider several school district characteristics that should not be affected by SFSF
spending. These characteristics are the fraction of students that are black, Hispanic, with an
individual education plan (IEP), and on free or reduced lunch. Estimates of the impact SFSF on
these characteristics in Panel B Table 6 are statistically insignificant and virtually zero. This
offers support for the validity of our 2SLS analysis.

<A>VI.

Summary and Conclusions

This project sought to answer one overriding question: how did the Great Recession
affect public schools? Our work has produced some interesting answers but it has generated
some important further questions as well. Our results strongly suggest that the growing role of
the states in public education magnified the impact of the GR. Over the last 40 years, states have
assumed more and more responsibility for funding public schools. This shift in the way schools
are financed is in part a result of legislative and judicial efforts to reduce the wedge between
resources in rich and poor schools. As previous work has shown, the increase in state funding
successfully reduced between-district inequality from 1972 through 2000. But this growing
reliance on the states has, however, proved costly. States rely on taxes that are particularly
sensitive to the ups and downs of the economy. The GR led to a steep decrease in state tax
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revenues and consequently state support for schools. An important question we do not address is
whether it is possible to have a more redistributive state system of support that does not subject
districts to these large systemic shocks. Given that states will continue to rely on income and
sales taxes, these goals seem incompatible.
We also found the surprising result that the GR had a much smaller impact on local
support for education. The recession began with a sharp fall in housing prices. Given that most
local school districts rely heavily on the property tax, one would expect that local tax revenues
would have fallen. This turned out not to be the case. As we showed in some of our state case
studies, school districts were able to raise tax millage rates to compensate for any loss in
property values. In four of five states we studied, we cannot reject the null that when property
values were falling, the elasticity of the millage rate with respect to per capita property values
was -1. The ease with which local governments can change the property tax stands in stark
contrast to voter sentiment about the property tax. Our results suggest that one possible reason
voters dislike the property tax is that local government spending always rises. When property
values per capita are increasing, the millage rate is left unchanged indicating that total
revenues/pupil increases in those situations. In contrast, when property value declines, the
millage rate is increased enough to make up for any revenue shortfall. Local revenues/pupil are
almost immune from reductions.
Starting in the early 2000s, the long-term secular decline in between-district inequality in
per student spending reversed, and now inequality is about the same as it was in 1972. In a span
of 12 years, 30-years of reductions in spending inequality were eliminated. This occurred well
before the start of the GR, and hence, this trend had little to do with the recession. In fact, the
available evidence suggests that GR may have reduced inequality slightly.
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However, it does leave open the question: why did things change so dramatically in the
early 2000s? Corcoran and Evans (2010) argue that in a simple median-voter model, rising
inequality due to changes in the top of the income distribution should increase public spending.
With an income or wealth tax, rising inequality at the top of the distribution reduces the cost to
the median voter of raising an extra dollar of revenues and hence increases spending. This is one
possible mechanism, but prior to this paper, no one has documented the rising inequality in
between-district spending over the past decade let alone identified a possible mechanism.
Finally, the Great Recession led to the largest expansion of federal support for public
education. Through ARRA, the federal government’s share of school district revenue nearly
doubled, albeit for a short period of time. The largest component of ARRA support for education
came through the State Fiscal Stabilization Funds. Our results suggest that the program worked
as intended: a dollar in ARRA support offset a dollar of state funding for education.
Unfortunately, our results do not answer a more difficult question which is what states would
have done had they not received stimulus funds.
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Table 1
State and Local Tax Revenues by Source, 2012
(in Millions of dollars)

Tax type
Income
Property
Sales

MV operator’s license
Other taxes

Tax source
Individual
Corporate
General
Motor fuels
Tobacco
Alcohol

State
Total
$225,019
$33,304
$10,233
$185,043
$31,357
$13,250
$4,516
$18,820
$94,658

Share
36.5%
5.4%
1.7%
30.0%
5.1%
2.2%
0.7%
3.1%
15.4%

Local
Total
Share
$84,839 10.8%
$15,929
2.0%
$464,167 59.3%
$111,224 14.2%
$11,173
1.4%
$4,079
0.5%
$1,953
0.2%
$9,933
1.3%
$79,743 10.2%

Total
$616,200
$783,040
Source: Quarterly Summery of State and Local Taxes, U.S. Census Bureau.

State+ Local
Total
Share
$309,858
22.1%
$49,233
3.5%
$474,400
33.9%
$296,267
21.2%
$42,530
3.0%
$17,329
1.2%
$6,469
0.5%
$28,753
2.1%
$174,401
12.5%
$1,399,240
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Table 2
OLS Estimates, Percentage Change in District Property Tax Millage Rates, Peak to Trough
as a Function of the Change in Property Values Per Capita

IL
(α1)

Di

(α2 ) %ΔPVPCi * Di
(α3) %ΔPVPCi *
(1-Di)
Constant

P-value on test:
α2 =α3
N
R2

State and Fiscal Years Included
WA
VA
TX

OH

Pooled
Sample
0.013

‘08 to ‘11
-0.017
(0.013)
-0.034
(0.042)
-1.190
(0.130)

’09 to ‘12
-0.073
(0.0437)
-0.308
(0.210)
-1.536
(0.106)

’06 to ‘11
0.031
(0.090)
0.111
(0.436)
-1.056
(0.166)

’09 to ‘13
-0.000
(0.007)
0.004
(0.041)
-0.097
(0.025)

’08 to ‘12
-0.019
(0.265)
-0.181
(0.159)
-0.927
(0.086)

0.048
(0.010)

0.143
(0.023)

-0.126
(0.036)

0.020
(0.003)

0.058
(0.015)

(0.013)

<0.0001

<0.0001

0.014

0.037

<0.0001

<0.0001

552
0.335

279
0.601

134
0.267

1021
0.018

612
0.265

2,598
0.410

(0.014)
-0.020

(0.072)
-0.959

(0.036)
0.051

Sample means
(unweighted):
% Δ tax rates
4.32%
23.6%
-0.24%
3.02%
9.60%
6.8%
% ΔPVPCi
8.50%
-4.14%
-13.4%
-3.39%
-3.94%
-1.6%
I(% ΔPVPCi >0)
67.2%
36.6%
12.7%
47.2%
34.9%
45.7%
Regressions are weighted by size of the district in the earlier year. The regression in the final column also
has state effects.
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Table 3
OLS Estimates of Equation Explaining % Change in Current Expenditures/pupil from 2007/08 to 2010/11
All districts in sample
(9,619 observations)
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.195
0.040
0.069
(0.068) (0.030) (0.040)
[0.014]

Districts in a CBSA
(3,692 observations)
(4)
(5)
(6)
0.213
0.027
0.122
(0.099)
(0.050)
(0.079)
[0.025]

Δ County unemployment rate,
07-11

-1.267
(0.313)
[0.060]

0.546
(0.216)

0.249
(0.225)

-1.076
(0.301)
[0.106]

0.759
(0.234)

0.379
(0.317)

% district revenues from state
sources, 07

-0.090
(0.027)
[0.005]

-0.026
(0.036)

-0.017
(0.036)

-0.085
(0.027)
[0.009]

-0.024
(0.029)

-0.019
(0.029)

0.033
(0.045)
[0.011]

-0.011
(0.037)

0.039
(0.065)

Covariates
% Δ County per capita
income, 07-11

% Δ CBSA housing price
index, 07-11
% Δ State per capita income,
07-11

0.048
(0.308)

-0.018
(0.328)

Δ State unemployment rate,
07-11

-2.637
(0.792)

-3.106
(0.818)

Share of state K-12 revenues
from state sources ‘07

-0.197
(0.095)

-0.217
(0.079)

% Δ State housing price
index, 07-11

-0.029
(0.074)

-0.114
(0.119)

Include state effects?
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
R2
0.1339
0.4701
0.2067
0.1607
0.4857
0.2432
There are 9,616 observations in the each regression. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors
allowing for arbitrary correlation in errors across districts within a state. The numbers in square brackets
are OLS standard errors.
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Table 4
OLS Estimates of Equation Explaining % Change in Pupil-Teacher Ratio from 2007/08 to 2011/12
All districts in sample
(9,619 observations)
(1)
(2)
(3)
-0.071 -0.005 -0.031
(0.075) (0.029) (0.036)
[0.016]

Districts in a CBSA
(3,692 observations)
(4)
(5)
(6)
-0.143
0.046
-0.029
(0.158) (0.046) (0.097)
[0.032]

Δ County unemployment rate,
07-11

0.639
(0.717)
[0.083]

-0.288
0.419
(0.165) (0.219)

1.229
(0.613)
[0.151]

-0.351
(0.390)

0.956
(0.583)

% district revenues from state
sources, 07

0.107
(0.050)
[0.007]

0.013
0.015
(0.017) (0.023)

0.083
(0.054)
[0.012]

-0.013
(0.022)

-0.017
(0.031)

0.069
(0.112)
[0.013]

-0.012
(0.049)

-0.037
(0.087)

Covariates
% Δ County per capita income,
07-11

% Δ CBSA housing price index,
07-11
% Δ State per capita income,
07-11

-0.212
(0.438)

-0.411
(0.390)

Δ State unemployment rate,
07-11

1.491
(1.250)

1.050
(1.580)

Share of state K-12 revenues
from state sources, 07

0.275
(0.118)

0.286
(0.137)

% Δ State housing price index,
07-11

0.203
(0.151)

0.328
(0.122)

Include state effects?
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
R2
0.0413 0.4455 0.0925
0.0411 0.4758
0.0813
There are 9,755 observations in the each regression. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors
allowing for arbitrary correlation in errors across districts within a state. The numbers in square brackets
are OLS standard errors.
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Table 5
Inequality in District-Level per Pupil Current Expenditures on K-12 Education, 1972-2013
Between- and Within-state Theil Index

Year

Gini
(x100)

95-to-5
ratio

1972

16.2

2.73

Coefficient
of Var.
Theil Index
(x100)
(x 1000)
Actual values at baseline
30.57
43.1

Within
States

Between
States

14.0

29.2

%
Within

Index values with 1972=1.00
32.4
1972
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.32
0.68
45.0
1982
0.85
0.81
0.84
0.71
0.32
0.39
31.3
1990
0.97
0.93
0.98
0.95
0.30
0.65
30.4
1992
0.93
0.90
0.96
0.90
0.28
0.63
30.7
1993
0.90
0.88
0.93
0.84
0.26
0.58
28.8
1994
0.86
0.85
0.91
0.80
0.23
0.57
28.2
1995
0.85
0.83
0.90
0.77
0.22
0.55
28.4
1996
0.82
0.81
0.87
0.73
0.21
0.52
28.6
1997
0.79
0.79
0.84
0.68
0.19
0.48
30.5
1998
0.75
0.77
0.80
0.62
0.19
0.43
30.4
1999
0.75
0.77
0.80
0.61
0.19
0.43
30.6
2000
0.74
0.76
0.79
0.61
0.19
0.42
31.4
2001
0.74
0.76
0.79
0.61
0.19
0.42
31.1
2002
0.76
0.77
0.81
0.64
0.20
0.44
30.4
2003
0.78
0.78
0.83
0.67
0.20
0.46
29.8
2004
0.81
0.79
0.87
0.73
0.22
0.51
28.7
2005
0.83
0.80
0.90
0.77
0.22
0.55
29.1
2006
0.83
0.81
0.92
0.80
0.23
0.57
28.6
2007
0.84
0.82
0.93
0.81
0.23
0.58
29.1
2008
0.85
0.83
0.94
0.84
0.24
0.59
28.0
2009
0.84
0.83
0.91
0.79
0.22
0.57
26.8
2010
0.86
0.85
0.94
0.83
0.22
0.61
25.7
2011
0.89
0.88
0.96
0.87
0.23
0.65
23.6
2012
0.93
0.90
1.02
0.97
0.23
0.74
22.6
2013
0.94
0.91
1.04
1.01
0.23
0.78
Data for 1972-1992 are from Corcoran and Evans (2009). All other calculations are by authors.

%
Between

67.6
55.0
68.7
69.6
69.3
71.2
71.8
71.6
71.4
69.5
69.6
69.4
68.6
68.9
69.6
70.2
71.3
70.9
71.4
70.9
72.0
73.2
74.3
76.4
77.4

41

Education Finance and Policy Just Accepted MS.
doi:10.1162/EDFP_a_00245
 by Association for Education Finance and Policy

Table 6
2SLS Results of Impact of Stimulus Spending on School District Outcomes,
Balanced Panel of Districts, 2005/06 – 2010/11
Panel A: Impacts to Per Pupil Revenues and Employment
OLS
Dependent
Variable:
Covariates

INSTijt / Pupilijt

SFSFijt / Pupilijt

R2

Sijt / Pupilijt

Local
rev./Pupil

Total
rev./Pupil

Employment/
Pupil

-0.936
(0.256)

0.103
(0.206)

0.239
(0.258)

-0.000
(0.000)

0.429

0.2668

0.3668

0.1851

0.831
(0.102)

SFSFijt / Pupilijt
1st stage F
(P-value)

2SLS

66.8
(<0.0001)
0.887

Panel B: Falsification Tests – Impacts on Student Demographics
OLS
Dependent
Variable:
Covariates

INSTijt / Pupilijt

SFSFijt / Pupilijt

Fraction
Black

Fraction
Hispanic

Fraction
IEP

-0.00002

-0.00000

0.00000

Fraction
Free/Red
Lunch

0.824
(0.105)

SFSFijt / Pupilijt
1st stage F
(P-value)

2SLS

(0.00000)

(0.00000) (0.00000)

-0.000018
(0.00002)

61.91
(<0.0001)

R2
0.2448
0.4155
0.4064
0.4407
Standard errors in parentheses allow for arbitrary correlation in errors within a state. Panel A: There are 6
observations per district for 9,450 districts for 56,700 observations. Other covariates in the model are
state-specific year effects and district fixed-effects. We cluster the standard errors at the state level.
Results are weighted by annual student enrollment. Panel B: As a falsification test, estimates in Panel B
explore the impact of SFSF funds on district demographics. Due to a small number of districts not
reporting demographic information every year, the balanced sample is slightly smaller than in Panel A.
The first stage estimates are not greatly altered as a result of this. Other covariates in the model are statespecific year effects and district fixed-effects. We cluster the standard errors at the state level. Results are
weighted by annual student enrollment.
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Figure 1
Time Series Plot of National Unemployment Rate and
De-Trended Real Current Expenditures/Pupil (2013$)
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Figure 2
Source of Revenues for K-12 Education, 1970/71 – 2011/12 School Years
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Figure 3
Index of Four-Quarter Moving Average of Quarterly State and Local Tax Revenues from
Property, Sales, Income and Corporate Taxes over the Last Three Recessions
(Start of Recession=100)
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Figure 4
Index of Four-Quarter Moving Average of Sources of State and Local
Tax Revenues over the Great recession (Start of the Recession =1000)
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Figure 5
Employment Index for Four Sectors over the Great Recession,
BLS Current Employment Statistic (100 = Start of the Recession)
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Figure 6
Teachers, Aids, Support Staff, and Other Education Employees,
1997/98 to 2013/14 School year (Index = 100 in 2007/08)
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Figure 7
Employment Index for K-12 Education over the Last Four Recessions,
BLS Current Employment Statistics (100 = Start of the Recession)
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Figure 8
Percentage Change in State Housing Price Index 2000 to 2011 vs.
Current Expenditures/Pupil in 2000
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